The Intelligence War against the IRA Page 19

  The Thatcher Government, 1979–1990

  Operation Banner states: ‘[t]he British Government’s main military objective in the 1980s was the destruction of PIRA’.57 Charles Powell, now Baron Powell of Bayswater, was the private secretary to Margaret Thatcher between 1983 and 1990. Baron Powell commented in the Endgame in Ireland documentary in 2001:

  Mrs Thatcher’s pre-occupation in dealing with Northern Ireland could be summed up in a single word – security … the task was to defeat the IRA … she … had rather less interest in trying to resolve the political aspects of the problem.58

  Thatcher’s approach primarily involved isolating Sinn Féin from political life in Northern Ireland, whilst ‘containing’ and damaging the IRA’s armed capabilities.59

  On the political front, Thatcher committed to ensuring that there would be no ‘honourable ceasefire’ for the IRA. Republican attacks including the Conservative Party conference bombing in Brighton in 1984 can account for Thatcher’s lack of appetite for political deals that included Sinn Féin. Furthermore, Thatcher believed that the hunger strikes showed that the Provisionals were increasingly uncompromising, and that this stance was in itself a sign of weakness.60 Admittedly, there was dialogue between Brendan Duddy and MI6’s Michael Oatley during the hunger strikes.61 But neither the British government nor the IRA viewed these conversations as the beginning of political dialogue. The backchannel contacts were terminated after the hunger strikes and did not resume until 1990.62 At first, Thatcher held a similar view to that of Mason: all-party talks would be a waste of time until the constitutional parties were ready to negotiate. Instead of focusing on talks, Thatcher ‘started from the need for greater security’.63 Following the deaths of Lord Mountbatten and eighteen British soldiers in August 1979, she sent Maurice Oldfield, formerly of MI6, to coordinate and improve the intelligence system in Northern Ireland. Other strategies included the use of the supergrasses and the return of the SAS to the province in the 1980s to try to make further inroads into the IRA.64

  The SDLP and the Irish government refused to support Thatcher’s approach to Northern Ireland unless the British state commenced talks about power-sharing with an Irish dimension. Thatcher ‘had to contemplate’ the Irish government’s demands if she wanted the Republic to counter the IRA.65 Humphrey Atkins, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, attempted multiparty talks in 1980. But hopes for a constitutional party settlement faded after the hunger strikes led to Sinn Féin’s electoral rise.66 Furthermore, the Ulster Unionist Party under James Molyneaux wanted greater integration with the United Kingdom; the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) favoured a return to majority rule; and the SDLP favoured power-sharing with an Irish dimension, particularly as they feared that settling for anything less would see their support drain towards Sinn Féin.67 The political divisions in Northern Ireland made a political settlement difficult to create.

  To try to increase support for the SDLP at the expense of Sinn Féin, the British government signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. The agreement provided the Irish Republic, and thus northern nationalists, with a consultative role over Northern Irish policy. The agreement tried to promote the message that constitutional nationalism succeeded in gaining improvements for the community, whilst violent republicanism did not. Edward Bickham, a British official involved in creating the agreement, argued that the British government had ‘a major interest’ in an Anglo-Irish agreement because ‘if our attempts crumble … [t]he SDLP might well disappear as a relatively coherent political force or even drift into accepting Sinn Fein policies without the violence’.68 Thatcher confirmed that the agreement showed her government’s determination to reject the Provisionals as part of any political settlement. During an interview with the Belfast Telegraph, the following exchange occurred:

  Des McCartan, Belfast Telegraph:[The Anglo-Irish Agreement] obviously does not envisage [working with] Sinn Fein …

  Margaret Thatcher:you cannot do everything in life … there are evil people about, but there are far … more who are decent and … want to work together and in the end you believe that those who … want to work together can overcome those who are disruptive.69

  The agreement sought to secure constitutional nationalist support in the security and political effort against the IRA.70 In the short term, however, the agreement failed to match Thatcher’s expectations because: ‘greater support by the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland or the Irish Government … for the fight against terrorism [was] not … forthcoming’.71 The Anglo-Irish Agreement also provoked anger amongst unionists, setting back the prospect of any return to power-sharing talks. Unionists were dismayed that they had not been consulted and that the Irish government had not changed their constitutional claim over Northern Ireland. In retaliation, unionists refused to engage with the British government for several years.72

  According to William Matchett, ‘[Thatcher] understood that ending the conflict and forming an inclusive devolved government depended on defeating the IRA, defeat defined as the IRA prioritising the ballot box over the Armalite.’73 Matchett suggests that the Thatcher administration sought to use the security and intelligence services to erode the capacity of the IRA and help push the republican movement towards democratic politics. Implicitly, this view suggests that the Thatcher government did eventually seek republicans’ inclusion in a political settlement within Northern Ireland, but only once IRA violence had ended. Some elements within the British state were promoting the type of policy that Matchett suggests existed under Thatcher. Following the election of Sinn Féin representatives on an abstentionist basis to Stormont in the early 1980s, one UK official commented:

  the Government’s long-term policy is to wean Sinn Fein … to constitutional politics … involvement in politics may occupy people who might otherwise be busy with violence and could lead to divisions in the PIRA/Sinn Fein leadership. 74

  This example suggests that some UK officials promoted ‘weaning’ Sinn Féin into constitutional politics in the 1980s.

  This perspective, however, was not shared by the majority of British government representatives at the time. The available evidence suggests that the Thatcher government was not aiming to politicise the republican movement from the early 1980s. The dominant consensus within the British state was that there should be no encouragement of Sinn Féin or republican leaders. There was to be no recommencing of backchannel conversations for most of the 1980s, since the Conservative government did not believe that republicans would renounce armed means. Douglas Hurd, the Conservative Northern Ireland Secretary of State in the mid-1980s, told the BBC Today programme in May 1985: ‘I never believed that you can actually woo the IRA or persuade them to behave in a law-abiding way by political means.’ Hurd advocated ‘a security policy which grinds down and eradicates the terrorists’. He also stressed that the British government wanted to ‘get the political process going properly so that the constitutional parties – not Sinn Fein’ could bring about political progress.75

  Political talks with Sinn Féin whilst IRA activity continued were consistently rejected by the British government up until 1985. In June 1983, James Prior, the Northern Ireland secretary at that time, told a Belfast press conference that ‘under no circumstances would he talk to … Gerry Adams, unless Mr Adams renounced violence’.76 Unlike in the 1990s when John Major made similar statements, the Conservative government throughout much of the 1980s was true to its word. Another example is the guidelines issued by Prior in January 1984 to civil servants and ministers. These stated that Sinn Féin support for the IRA meant that ‘Ministers will have no further contact with Sinn Fein representatives.’ Prior added: ‘Government departments should decline any request for meetings with Sinn Fein representatives.’ Prior said that to prevent Sinn Féin propaganda about their political mandate being ignored, UK officials should reply to letters and requests from republican political representatives. But ‘in light of the Government’s general attitude to Sinn Fein it would plainly be w
rong for Ministers to reply personally’. Instead, a private secretary would provide a ‘curt, formal and short’ reply.77 The British government did not favour other nationalists talking to Sinn Féin either, especially since they were trying to secure SDLP support against republicans. Hurd, for instance, claimed that John Hume was foolish for talking to the IRA about a political settlement in February 1985, saying ‘it is pointless to talk to people as irredeemably dedicated to the cause of violence’.78

  A case could be made for suggesting that British strategy towards republicans began to alter after 1986. According to Moloney, Tom King, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State between 1985 and 1989, alongside select members of the intelligence services, replied to letters from Adams. The British made it clear that they would be willing for republicans to help create a political settlement, and that they were ‘indifferent about the nature of any settlement as long as it was not imposed by force’. The British state first required that the IRA ended their armed campaign before talks could begin. Moloney believes that there was no departure from British government policy in replying to Adams: ‘Britain had always made it clear that IRA violence was an obstacle to Sinn Fein’s taking part in normal political life.’79 McKearney provides a similar view. He believes that the hunger strikes fundamentally altered British strategy towards Irish republicanism:

  (post-internment, pre-hunger strike) … the [British] objective was to entomb the IRA physically as well as politically … the … SDLP would fill the vacuum and again enter a power-sharing administration … The hunger strikes of 1980–81 derailed this plan … the insurgents had a bedrock of support that could not easily be eroded … the British introduced a third phase, which involved creating conditions that would encourage a significant section of the IRA to engage within Northern Ireland’s parliamentary political process.

  McKearney believes that ‘repression’ remained vital in order to remove IRA hardliners. But the British ultimately wanted a deal with the Adams leadership, McKearney suggests, because it was ‘better to deal with the devil you know’.80 Following this line of argument, the King contacts could be viewed as part of a British strategy aimed at drawing republicanism towards a political compromise.

  The trouble with subscribing to this view is that King cut contacts with Adams in 1987 because of continuing IRA activities. These activities included the police arresting IRA volunteers at King’s Wiltshire estate with plans to target him. Moloney admits that ‘the stark difference’ between Adams’ statements alluding to peace and the IRA’s actions in terms of continuing its campaign convinced the British state that the IRA was ‘spoofing’.81 Yet Moloney does not conclude that the British Conservative government did not envisage a political settlement with republicans occurring thereafter. Between 1980 and 1989, the British government showed little interest in bringing republicans into a political settlement. The British government introduced a broadcasting ban, an oath of non-violence for councillors in Northern Ireland and restrictions on funding to republican projects. These measures sought to reduce republican influence over political affairs in Northern Ireland. There were even discussions held, between 1983 and 1985, about again proscribing Sinn Féin. This idea was primarily ruled out because the Irish government did not introduce similar legislation that could have made a British ban appear a proportionate response to republicanism across the island of Ireland. The British government also feared creating ‘martyrs’ and another hunger-strike situation by outlawing Sinn Féin.82 These pre-1989 measures against Sinn Féin were not designed to pressurise them into multiparty talks, because no such talks were on offer that included republicans. The IRA’s continuing campaign convinced Thatcher and her ministers that the republican movement would never accept a political compromise. One UK civil servant, for instance, commented in 1983 that they doubted that the ‘attractions of talking about drains and constituency interests … outweigh the benefits they [republicans] gain from violence’.83

  The Conservative government in the 1980s also feared that talks with republicans on a political settlement would anger and undermine the SDLP and the Irish government.84 Officials from the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs told their British counterparts in the Northern Ireland Office of this fear during a conversation in August 1984. Irish government representatives made it clear to the British officials that the Fine Gael government in Dublin wanted no contact to take place between constitutional parties and Sinn Féin, in order to try to reduce the publicity and support for the latter.85 It is also worth noting that the left-wing stances taken up by the Sinn Féin leaders in the 1980s encouraged the Thatcher government not to engage in political talks with republicans.86 In November 1983, Prior argued that people across Ireland had to stop Sinn Féin’s electoral advance. Otherwise, he foresaw a ‘Cuba off our western coast.’87

  The British state under Thatcher’s government did not seek to engage the republican movement in dialogue surrounding a political settlement in the period leading up to 1989. On the contrary, the British government encouraged the conviction of Sinn Féin leaders if it was felt that they were connected to the IRA.88 In the meantime, the intelligence conflict sought to contain republican armed activity at a minimal level. The British government sought to isolate Sinn Féin and create a political compromise between the SDLP, unionists and the Irish government.

  The Return to Political Dialogue, July 1989 to August 1994

  Peter Brooke, the new Northern Ireland Secretary of State in July 1989, switched to attempting to create a political compromise that would include Sinn Féin and bring an end to IRA activity.89 Dialogue recommenced with republicans via public statements and backchannel talks through intermediaries, despite continuing IRA activity. In November 1989, for example, Brooke suggested that the British could not militarily defeat the IRA and promised ‘imaginative’ dialogue if the conflict ended.90 Brooke also authorised MI6’s Michael Oatley to recommence discussions with the Provisionals’ ‘contact’ Brendan Duddy. Oatley met with McGuinness in October 1990, with contact continuing between British and IRA intermediaries until late 1993.91 Senior figures within the British state now supported re-engaging with republicans. MI6 via Oatley, MI5’s John Deverell and other intermediaries played some part in the backchannel talks. The intelligence agencies clearly agreed with re-engagement.92 In addition, by November 1989, Margaret Thatcher – and, later, her successor John Major – obviously supported the new political strategy since they allowed Brooke to make conciliatory statements and to reopen backchannel contacts. No longer was the British state seeking to isolate republicans from politics in Northern Ireland. Instead, they wanted a political settlement that included the Provisionals, provided that the IRA ended its armed campaign beforehand.93

  As IRA violence continued, however, John Major still believed: ‘[m]any [IRA] members knew no other way of living than through violence … and would never give it up voluntarily’. As a result, Major insisted that the British state needed to continue: ‘squeezing out terrorism by every means, persuasive as well as military’.94 A former civil servant who was working with Major at the time on Northern Ireland agrees that there were two strands to British policy towards the IRA in the 1990s. The thinking was that success in getting the IRA to end its campaign could emerge ‘the harder you lean down successfully in containing the security threat, and the more you open the door with the bright sunshine behind it’.95 A dual strategy towards the republican movement had re-emerged by 1990, similar to that created by Rees and Wilson in 1974.96 The security forces would continue their intelligence and overt operations to erode the IRA’s armed capacity. The British government hoped that a decline in the IRA’s campaign would quickly force republicans into a ceasefire. In the meantime, the British government would talk to the Provisional leadership before and during a ceasefire to persuade them to accept an internal power-sharing settlement.97

  Conclusion

  After 1975, senior British policy-makers no longer believed that the IRA would settle for
a political compromise. Rees believed that the republican leadership’s willingness to continue negotiations showed that the IRA was facing permanent decline. As a result, The Way Ahead document in 1977 stipulated that the British state should no longer engage in talks with republicans. The British government saw the restriction of IRA violence to an ‘acceptable level’ as conducive to potential political agreements between constitutional nationalists and unionists.

  The continuation of IRA activity convinced the Thatcher administration that there could be no political settlement involving republicans for many years. Instead, the Thatcher government wanted the isolation and demise of the IRA and Sinn Féin, to be achieved partly via an intelligence campaign, and by ensuring no contact occurred with republican leaders. Only if republican leaders renounced violence would the British government change its approach. Other than Peter Brooke, the various secretaries of state during the 1980s did not ultimately see evidence that republican leaders wanted a political settlement; they drew this conclusion because of continuing IRA activity. The aim of enticing republicans to fully politicise via backchannel negotiations was only readopted from 1989. In order to force republicans to promptly agree to a political compromise, the Major government followed a similar strategy to that of Rees and Wilson between 1974 and 1975. There would be a combination of backchannel conversations alongside a continuing intelligence campaign to erode the IRA’s armed capacity. The following chapters examine whether this intelligence campaign was a significant factor in the IRA’s decision to end its armed campaign.