The Intelligence War against the IRA Page 7

  Several factors explain the initial poor cooperation between the intelligence agencies. The RUC Special Branch was loyal to Stormont. The British Army and MI5 were loyal to Westminster. Westminster was not always supportive of unionist Stormont’s actions and slow reforms. In contrast, the unionist government at Stormont directed the RUC to maintain the status quo. Personalities also affected cooperation. Clarke says that some MILOs working with RUC Special Branch ‘were upper-class twits, living in another world’. He adds: ‘[army] units had a four-month stint [tour] and all they really wanted were “kills” or “trophies”’. Clarke did not always pass intelligence to the Army for this reason. He felt that they might endanger RUC Special Branch sources. Furthermore, Clarke recalls how the ‘military were recruiting potential sources … and only some of the intelligence gleaned was finding its way into the pipeline’. He points out that: ‘[t]here were no clear lines drawn in the sand as to the exact nature of the intelligence-gathering operations in respect of the RUC/British Army’. Clarke gives us a sense of the initially uncoordinated intelligence system in Northern Ireland.78 A former British soldier said that he ‘never really understood why’ the Army had its own sources of intelligence separate from Special Branch. He added that some people ‘would only work for the Army, and there were some who would only work for the police’.79 Matchett believes that the Army wanted its own agents and informers for ‘power’. He disagrees that particular individuals would not work for Special Branch.80 Yet the earlier example of Observer B contradicts Matchett. Observer B apparently felt the RUC were sectarian and refused to work for them.81

  The intelligence agencies’ unwillingness to share information disrupted security efforts against the IRA. As Omand suggests, successful intelligence efforts required government agencies to work in tandem towards agreed objectives.82 In Northern Ireland the intelligence structures were at times inefficient and ineffective because of inter-agency rivalries.

  Rural IRA Units

  The IRA’s campaign in rural areas between 1970 and June 1972 has received little attention in academic literature (with a few notable exceptions).83 Danny Morrison believes that it is ‘a mistake to argue that the [IRA’s] war was simply being fought in Belfast or Derry’. I emphasise this argument throughout this book.84 It is understandable to some extent that there has been limited coverage of rural units before 1972. Three of the most active rural IRA brigades operated in south Armagh, east Tyrone and Fermanagh. Personnel within these units also operated at times from across the border, or received support from cross-border units.85 In 1971, however, IRA operations in Armagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone were infrequent: the South Armagh IRA killed three ‘targets’, including custom officials and security-force members; in Tyrone, the IRA killed a soldier, a UDR member and two other former security-force members; in Fermanagh, they killed a UDR member. Before the June 1972 ceasefire, the South Armagh IRA had become more active, targeting five security-force members; the Tyrone and Fermanagh IRA units each killed two security-force members.86 Activity by the IRA in rural areas remained infrequent before June 1972.

  GOC Harry Tuzo told a British government meeting at Downing Street on 21 March 1972: ‘[t]he situation in the rural areas of the Province [is] comparatively stable, and would improve as more intelligence became available and more military resources could be diverted from Belfast’.87 Tuzo felt that ‘more intelligence’ would turn the tide against the IRA in rural areas if needed. His statement implies that once the Army had sufficiently damaged the Belfast IRA, it would turn its attention to rural areas. Another report by the Commander of Land Forces (CLF) in March 1972 agreed: ‘[t]he redeployment of some [Army] units from Belfast to these [rural] areas, which is planned to take place at the end of April, should lead to improved intelligence and increasing success’. The CLF added: ‘[t]he expected IRA move to the country areas has not yet materialised … increased force levels planned for the end of April should make it difficult for them to achieve a great deal when they do’.88 These reports support Tommy McKearney’s view: ‘the British government and Northern Ireland authorities … decided … to gain control in Belfast and Derry to effectively secure their base in the towns. After that then they could deal with the rural parts.’89 Later chapters will challenge McKearney’s view that urban areas remained the focus of British security policy into the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, he is right that, in the early 1970s, the GOC and CLF believed that rural areas were not a specific threat. More importantly, they felt that the campaign against the IRA would be won or lost in Belfast and Derry City.

  George Clarke’s account of working for Special Branch on the border in the early 1970s suggests that low-level rural IRA activity was partly a result of infiltration. Clarke mentions acquiring ‘three or four good sources’ in the South Armagh and South Down IRA between September and December 1971. He claims that these sources provided ‘gold dust’ intelligence. For instance, Clarke alleges that these sources spent time across the border in Dundalk in hotels, houses and pubs owned by republican sympathisers. He reported their information informally to his Garda Special Branch contacts. This example challenges suggestions from individual British security-force members that there was no cooperation between the RUC and Garda intelligence in this period. The strength of such unofficial cooperation relied on goodwill between specific police officers on either side of the border.90 In December 1971, this information led to the arrest of a senior Provisional, and the seizure of ammunition in Dundalk. ‘[M]y intelligence [sources]’, Clarke states, ‘prevented … ambushes at Crossmaglen, Killeen, Newry and Mayobridge’. Whilst admitting that between September and December 1971 there were still ‘a dozen bombings, numerous shootings and armed robberies’, Clarke ponders, ‘[w]hat would the figures have been without Special Branch input?’91

  There are currently no other accounts available to corroborate Clarke’s claims in their entirety. Clarke seems to be telling the truth about his role, as another RUC Special Branch officer confirmed Clarke’s previous position to Henry Patterson.92 In addition, in his study of the South Armagh IRA, Toby Harnden mentioned that the IRA were targeting alleged spies in the early 1970s. For instance, in June 1971, Harnden notes that IRA volunteers abducted, poured tar over and shot a farmer in Dundalk. The South Armagh IRA allege that this person had given evidence in court against republicans. This case shows that the IRA were aware of potential agents and informers in the Dundalk area, where many South Down and South Armagh recruits were on the run.93 Clarke’s account names republicans who were part of the movement in that area.94 He alleges that one particular republican was from County Louth, and that he set up this republican’s arrest via intelligence from a source. Harnden also discusses the same republican’s alleged IRA activities.95

  The security services in rural areas were also building an intelligence picture from the card-index system of vehicles. A Ministry of Defence document from June 1973 recalled that the system involved British Army ‘companies keep[ing] records on all vehicles kept in the company area … Lists of stolen cars and wanted cars are also maintained.’ This particular document alluded to the IRA’s use of vehicles in rural border areas: ‘terrorist vehicle traffic across the border with the Republic is considerable and includes the conveyance of personnel, weapons, ammunition and explosives … operations, political activities and escaping following crimes’.96 The IRA in rural areas used the border to evade arrest in the North on a number of occasions. In retaliation, British forces closed certain border roads. They also created permanent vehicle checkpoints and snap vehicle checkpoints on approved roads. Thereafter, the list of vehicles gathered could help potentially catch IRA volunteers travelling in their own or in stolen cars. In 1972, the British Army claimed that they were searching ‘nearly 8400 vehicles … each day’.97 Nonetheless, the IRA became aware of the permanent vehicle checkpoints. As we shall see, Operation Banner concluded that, in hindsight, permanent vehicle checkpoints posed an increased risk to the security forces. Even snap
vehicle checkpoints were often ineffective because ‘[a]fter a few cars had passed through it, word would get round and even innocent traffic would avoid it’.98

  The security and intelligence services were also creating ‘personality cards’ across Northern Ireland. These ‘P’ cards recorded details such as name ‘sex and marital status; date of birth … terrorist order of battle reference … wanted list number; file/photograph reference number; address … brigade, battalion or company in whose area the suspect resides’.99 Since the rural IRA’s campaign increased in intensity after the ceasefire ended in July 1972, however, it appears that neither personality cards nor vehicle checks were effective against them. The ability of the South Armagh, East Tyrone and Fermanagh IRA to use the border to evade capture partly explains why these intelligence methods were not successful. The vehicle-checking system was also somewhat limited by its reliance on DVLA operators at Coleraine having to check the licensing details for a suspicious vehicle. The search involved ‘a physical visual search of files’, meaning that ‘the staff cannot cope with more than about 10 requests an hour’.100 With rural IRA members sometimes hiding in, or permanently residing in, the Irish Republic, the personality cards were redundant at times too.

  Agents and informers had not contained the IRA’s campaign in rural localities by June 1972. The IRA intended-target-killing statistics in rural areas discussed above show an increase in IRA killings of security-force members in rural areas by July 1972. Other reasons better account for the lack of momentum behind the rural IRA’s campaign before 1972. One explanation is that the Official IRA (OIRA), the Marxist rivals to the Provisionals, retained significant support in rural villages and towns before that organisation’s permanent ceasefire in May 1972. It was the OIRA, for example, that shot a soldier near Crossmaglen in November 1971, and an RUC officer in Camlough in March 1972.101 In County Tyrone, Tommy McKearney also recalls that ‘[b]y mid-1971, while the Provisional IRA had established a basic skeleton organization in the county, they were still a minority in comparison to the Official IRA’.102 The issues that divided republicans in Belfast – including the need to defend nationalist areas against loyalists – were not initially present in rural areas.103 For this reason, at first there was no incentive to split from the mainstream OIRA in the countryside. Seán MacStiofáin, the IRA Chief of Staff, also recalls how with ‘new units springing up all over the place [this] created tremendous problems for the Republican supply organization’.104 McKearney agrees that in County Tyrone, despite the increase of recruits after internment, ‘the leadership’s biggest problem in the area was not finding manpower but accessing sufficient arms’.105

  Various factors explain why the IRA’s support had increased in rural localities by June 1972. MacStiofáin believes that the IRA’s defence of working-class nationalist areas in Belfast convinced many rural republicans to join the Provisionals in solidarity.106 This explanation seems plausible, since clashes between the IRA and security forces in the cities would have appeared on television.107 Furthermore, as Northern Ireland is a small place, many rural Catholics had relatives or friends in Belfast or Derry who were caught up in either loyalist or British Army actions from 1969. Knowledge of these events would increase anger towards the British forces. In August 1971, for example, Harry Thornton, a worker from south Armagh, was travelling through Belfast. He was shot by the British Army when his van backfired. The Army believed that the noise this created was the sound of an IRA attack. According to Harnden, Thornton’s death led to ‘scores of young men in South Armagh [applying] to join the IRA’. A riot occurred in Crossmaglen on the night of Thornton’s funeral.108 In addition, a few IRA volunteers were ‘on-the-runs’ from the cities. They had fled to the border areas by 1972, with a few getting involved in IRA activities. The most dramatic example of this came in January 1972. Two Belfast Crumlin Road jail escapees, Martin Meehan and Anthony ‘Dutch’ Doherty, took part in a lengthy gun battle against the British Army in south Armagh.109 The participation of on-the-run volunteers in rural operations, however, was rare, for reasons to be explained.

  The main catalysts for increased rural IRA activity were historical and contemporary events. Danny Morrison suggests that it is ‘totally false’ to argue that the Harry Thornton killing on 7 August 1971, two days before the introduction of internment, alone ‘trigger[ed] the growth of the IRA in … south Armagh’. The South Armagh IRA had in fact already carried out one of the first uses of a car bomb during the conflict in August 1970, killing two RUC officers near Crossmaglen.110 There was also a historical hatred of the British state on the part of some nationalists in counties Armagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone. When elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly as an abstentionist candidate for mid-Ulster in 1982, Morrison discovered that many older nationalists were committed republicans:

  [o]ne of the most important factors which a lot of the older people [said made them support the republican movement] was that … Michael Collins had actually convinced the majority of the IRA in the North that partition was only temporary [in 1921] … But of course the Unionists when they got into power … repudiated the boundary commission and began dismantling the safeguards (such as PR in elections) that were introduced and intended to mitigate against the alienation of nationalists from the new state.111

  There remained long-term anger that partition had forced border republicans into the Northern Irish state.112 Peter John Caraher, for example, a one-time leading republican in south Armagh, had relatives who had fought in the Irish War of Independence and Irish Civil War in the 1920s. The British Army killed one of his sons, Fergal Caraher, in a controversial incident in 1990. According to An Phoblacht, Fergal was a republican activist.113 Another son, Micheál Caraher, was injured in the same incident. He was later convicted in 1999 of, amongst other things, shooting and attempting to kill an RUC constable. Micheál was freed early under the Good Friday Agreement’s release scheme.114 One of Peter John Caraher’s daughters was also elected for Sinn Féin in 1996. Peter John Caraher died in 2011. He was described by Gerry Adams as ‘a steadfast republican’.115 The tradition of rebellion against British rule in some border areas even stretched back as far as the O’Neill rebellion under the Tudors.116

  South Armagh was not unique in its history of militant republicanism. McKearney recalls that nationalists in County Tyrone ‘had a long tradition of electing IRA personnel from Crumlin Road jail to Westminster, even in the 1950s’.117 In May 1955, Tyrone nationalists elected republican Tom Mitchell to the Mid-Ulster constituency on an abstentionist basis. Mitchell was a convicted IRA volunteer who had taken part in the Omagh barracks raid in 1954 during the IRA’s failed border campaign. Phil Clarke, another IRA member captured during the Omagh raid, was elected to the Fermanagh–South Tyrone constituency, a seat later won by Bobby Sands.118 There was potentially sizeable support for militant republicanism in County Tyrone.119 The vote for Phil Clarke shows a core republican support existing in County Fermanagh too.

  Short-term factors in each locality also increased republican recruitment. Discrimination by local unionist authorities in western localities in Northern Ireland, British Army actions against rural nationalists, and the end of the Official IRA’s campaign in 1972 had given the Provisional IRA’s campaign momentum in border areas by 1972. These factors reignited dormant tensions against British rule. Unionist discrimination directly affected the lives of many nationalists in Tyrone, Armagh and Fermanagh. John Whyte explains how discrimination in the allocation of state housing, public employment and electoral boundaries was more ‘prominent’ west of the River Bann. As the Catholic–nationalist population either matched or exceeded the Protestant–unionist population there, local unionists decided to discriminate in order to maintain their hold on local authorities. In Dungannon in County Tyrone, for instance, a 53-per-cent Catholic voting majority returned only seven councillors, compared to fourteen Protestant–unionist councillors.120 For elections to Fermanagh County Council, Taylor records that there was an
even split between the two communities. But unionists always won, and ensured that two-thirds of the public houses built between 1945 and 1969 went to Protestants.121 In Tyrone, nationalists saw discrimination in the allocation of housing as so unfair that in June 1968, Austin Currie, later a leading SDLP figure, began squatting at a house in Caledon. This protest was in reaction to the provision of public housing to Emily Beattie, a nineteen-year-old single Protestant, over Catholic families. Following the forcible removal of Currie and others from the squat, McKearney reports that this ‘provoked a 3,000 strong protest [civil rights] march from Coalisland to Dungannon in county Tyrone’.122 The IRA partly benefitted from the anger that local discrimination caused.123

  Specific British Army actions also provoked hostility between rural nationalists and the British state. The Army began blocking and cratering cross-border roads to disrupt IRA activity.124 In hindsight, Operation Banner admits that closing border roads was ‘generally unpopular with the local population, many of whom had legitimate farming or other business interests and family links on both sides of the Border’. The Army concedes that locals would often remove roadblocks themselves.125 Obstructing cross-border trade created tolerance and even active support for the IRA in rural areas, especially from poorer rural tradesmen and farmers whose livelihoods relied on such trade.126

  Many nationalists living on the border looked to the Republic for their recreational activities. They often felt greater cultural affinity with Irish citizens and had family in southern Ireland. Derry nationalists often went to Donegal; Tyrone nationalists frequently travelled to Monaghan; south Armagh and Down nationalists visited Dundalk. Restricting access to the Irish Republic increased initial tolerance of the IRA, if not actual support for that organisation. On the other side of the border, British Army obstructions created anger for similar reasons for the people of Dundalk, Monaghan and Donegal. A sizeable minority of people allowed the Provisionals relative freedom over the border during the early part of the conflict in these areas for these reasons.127