The Intelligence War against the IRA Read online

  The Intelligence War against the IRA

  The exposure of two senior Irish republicans as informers for British intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had ‘lost’ the intelligence war and had been pressurised into peace. In this first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain’s intelligence activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to special forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence operate against paramilitaries? Are its methods effective? When should governments ‘talk to terrorists’? Does regional variation explain the differing outcomes of intelligence conflicts? This is a major contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace emerged in Northern Ireland.

  Thomas Leahy is a lecturer in British and Irish politics and contemporary history in the Politics and International Relations department at Cardiff University.

  The Intelligence War against the IRA

  Thomas Leahy

  Cardiff University

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  Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108487504

  DOI: 10.1017/9781108767033

  © Thomas Leahy 2020

  This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

  First published 2020

  Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd, Padstow Cornwall

  A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Names: Leahy, Thomas, 1987– author.

  Title: The intelligence war against the IRA / Thomas Leahy, Cardiff University.

  Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

  Identifiers: LCCN 2019038702 (print) | LCCN 2019038703 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108487504 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108767033 (ebook)

  Subjects: LCSH: Ireland – History, Military. | Irish Republican Army – History. | Political violence – Northern Ireland – History. | Counterinsurgency – Northern Ireland – History. | Northern Ireland – History, Military. | Great Britain. Army – History. | Ireland – History – 1922– | Intelligence service – Ireland – History – 20th century. | Intelligence services – Great Britain – History – 20th century. | Informers – Ireland – History – 20th century.

  Classification: LCC DA914 .L43 2020 (print) | LCC DA914 (ebook) | DDC 363.325/1530941–dc23

  LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019038702

  LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019038703

  ISBN 978-1-108-48750-4 Hardback

  ISBN 978-1-108-72040-3 Paperback

  Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

  To Sara

  Contents

  Acknowledgements

  List of Abbreviations

  Introduction

  Part IThe Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 19721British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: August 1969 to July 1972

  2The Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 1972

  3The IRA’s Ceasefire: 26 June to 9 July 1972

  Part IIOn the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 19754British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: July 1972 to December 1975

  5The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975

  6‘Everything Is Compromisable after the British Declaration of Intent’: The IRA Returns to Ceasefire, December 1974 to December 1975

  Part IIIThe Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 19987British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998

  8The Intelligence War against the IRA in Belfast and Derry City, January 1976 to August 1994

  9The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994

  10‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997

  Conclusion

  Appendix 1IRA ‘Intended-Target’ Killings by Year in Various Geographical Areas Where the IRA Operated, 1969–1994

  Appendix 2Seats Won by Sinn Féin and the SDLP in District Council Elections between 1985 and 1997

  Appendix 3Other Alleged Agents and Informers Killed by the IRA

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Index

  Acknowledgements

  There are many people whose time and efforts have assisted this book’s creation. This book is based on my PhD thesis, which was completed at King’s College London. I thank my thought-provoking supervisor Ian McBride (now at Oxford University) for encouraging, advising and developing my ideas. I also thank other academic staff at King’s College London including Paul Readman, Frank Foley, Tim Stevens, Stephen Lovell and Michael Kerr for their valuable feedback during the PhD process. I also appreciate the constructive reviews by the two referees for Cambridge University Press, whose input has significantly contributed to the formation of this book.

  I am particularly indebted to Huw Bennett of Cardiff University. Huw has provided valuable feedback regarding how best to develop my thesis into a book. He also assisted me during my first academic position lecturing on the Northern Ireland Conflict at Cardiff University. Huw’s knowledge on the British military, the Northern Ireland conflict and the world of academia has been invaluable. The same words echo in relation to the feedback and support of Niall Ó Dochartaigh of the National University of Ireland Galway. His innovative angle on the conflict also inspired me as an undergraduate student to further develop the existing research on the conflict.

  Various colleagues and PhD students at Cardiff University and the National University of Ireland Galway have supported the creation of this book. These include: Claudia Hillebrand, Jon Kirkup, Ian Stafford, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Stephen Thornton, Pete Dorey, Gary Hussey, Noémi Farkas, Anna Tulin Brett, Giada Lagana and Maciej Cupryś. I am grateful for the help of all academic staff in the Politics and International Relations department at Cardiff University. The department has assisted this research by providing funding to update the PhD thesis. Students that I have worked with at King’s College London, Cardiff University and NUI Galway have also provided ideas that have developed the arguments in this book. I apologise for any names that I have missed.

  I am very grateful to all the interviewees for particip
ating in my research, and to all of those who helped to arrange interviews. The interviewees were generous with their time and patience on such a sensitive topic.

  Special thanks goes to the Institute of Historical Research. Their Scouloudi Historical Research Award in 2016 allowed me to update the research from my thesis. Whilst I was pursuing my PhD, King’s College London provided me with research grants and a King’s Continuation Scholarship to support my research.

  Michael Watson, Emily Sharp, Lisa Carter and Stephanie Taylor at Cambridge University Press, and Frances Tye as the copy-editor, have provided crucial guidance on academic publication.

  The staff at the following institutions kindly granted permission to quote from their material and related archives: Imperial War Museum Sound Archives; King’s College London’s Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives; the London School of Economics Library Archives; the Hardiman Library’s special collections at the National University of Ireland Galway; the Linen Hall Library’s Northern Ireland Political Collection in Belfast; the Bodleian Library’s Harold Wilson papers at Oxford University; the Labour History Archive and Study Centre in Manchester; and the National Library of Ireland. I appreciate the time and kindness of their staff.

  I also thank Brian Reynolds, William O’Donnell, Lucy Dale, Daniel Orders, Ari Orders, Elizabeth Leahy, Christopher Leahy, Non Williams, Dewi Williams, Sheila Leahy and other family members for their support. In particular, I thank my now-deceased relatives Danny Leahy, Mary Hastings and Patrick Hastings for sparking an interest in Irish history and politics.

  This book is dedicated to my wife Sara, whose support over many years has ensured that I have been able to complete this book.

  Abbreviations

  14 Intelligence Company

  Undercover surveillance unit for the British Army

  CLF

  Commander of Land Forces (British Army)

  DCI

  Director and Coordinator of Intelligence Northern Ireland

  E4A

  Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch section conducting surveillance operations

  E4B/HMSU

  Headquarters Mobile Support Unit, a Royal Ulster Constabulary special support unit

  FRU

  Force Research Unit

  GHQ

  IRA General Headquarters Staff

  GOC

  General Officer Commanding (British Army)

  INLA

  Irish National Liberation Army

  MI5

  Military Intelligence Section Five, the UK’s internal intelligence agency

  MI6

  Secret Intelligence Service, the UK’s external intelligence agency

  MILO

  Military Intelligence Liaison Officer

  MRF

  Military Reaction Force

  OIRA

  Official Irish Republican Army, a Marxist rival to the Provisional IRA

  Old IRA

  The original Irish Republican Army

  Provisional IRA

  Provisional Irish Republican Army

  PSNI

  Police Service of Northern Ireland

  RUC

  Royal Ulster Constabulary, the former police force for Northern Ireland

  RUCR

  Royal Ulster Constabulary Reserve

  SAS

  Special Air Service

  SDLP

  Social Democratic and Labour Party

  RUC Special Branch

  Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch

  UDR

  Ulster Defence Regiment. Incorporated into the Royal Irish Rangers regiment (RIR) in the 1990s

  Introduction

  Intelligence has been a crucial aspect of modern counter-insurgency strategy.1 It has played, for example, a prominent role during the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians,2 and decolonialisation campaigns involving the British state since 1945.3 For this reason, academics have debated the impact of agents, informers, electronic intelligence and special forces on modern conflicts.4 British forces have been fighting various insurgent and paramilitary groups since 1945. As a result, there is a growing literature on the effectiveness of British intelligence in small-scale conflicts. Christopher Andrew details the use of informers by the British during the Cyprus Emergency in the 1950s. British intelligence recruited informers from the Greek-Cypriot EOKA5 and the Turkish-Cypriot population. Their information enabled British security forces to capture and kill a number of leading EOKA rebels. Andrew argues that this ‘intelligence-led’ effort was one important factor enabling the British government to create a political compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.6 Huw Bennett describes how informers and other sources of intelligence also helped the British to end the Mau Mau campaign in Kenya during the 1950s.7

  Based on these recent experiences, the British state once again used intelligence in Northern Ireland. British intelligence deployed various methods against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) from 1969 including informers, electronic intelligence and special forces. Similar to the EOKA, the IRA hid within specific communities to conduct its campaign. British forces required inside information from the IRA or the republican community to disrupt IRA activities. The IRA were under no illusions about the importance of this secret intelligence war, and knew that it would play a part in determining their success or failure. The republican newspaper An Phoblacht commented in 1974: ‘the greatest weapon England has is that of the informer. Without [them] it is possible that the people of Ireland would have had full control over their country a long time ago.’8 A brief survey of previous conflicts between Irish republicans and the British state shows that there is some truth to this claim. Informers hindered the United Irishmen rebellion under Wolfe Tone in 1798. Following infiltration, spies set up the arrests and executions of rebel leaders.9 The Fenians in the 1800s also faced disruption to their activities following infiltration.10 British intelligence did not have similar success in Ireland between 1919 and 1921. The original Irish Republican Army (old IRA) achieved the secession of twenty-six counties from the United Kingdom. Aided by electoral support for republicans, IRA attacks and counter-intelligence operations encouraged the British government to negotiate in 1921.11 The Provisional IRA knew from the past that its success partly depended on resisting British intelligence strategies.

  The impact of the British intelligence war on the Provisional IRA has become the subject of fierce debate. One of the main catalysts for this debate is the top IRA informer code-named Stakeknife. The man behind this name is alleged to have been Freddie Scappaticci from Belfast. From the late 1970s, Scappaticci supposedly worked for the British Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU). The FRU’s job was to recruit agents and informers within the paramilitary groups. Scappaticci also allegedly operated as a chief spy-hunter within the IRA’s internal security unit.12 Scappaticci denies that he was ‘Stakeknife’. He also denies involvement in IRA activities.13 However, a range of Northern Ireland conflict participants and observers claim that the allegations are true. Those who support the allegations include Martin Ingram, a former FRU officer, as well as various Irish republicans, journalists and academics.14 Danny Morrison, the former Sinn Féin director of publicity, claims that he was later made aware that Scappaticci had set up his arrest in 1990. Morrison’s conviction was later quashed. Morrison argues: ‘Scappaticci was the [UK] Prime Minister’s man murdering weak … and compromised IRA Volunteers, and civilian supporters, in order to perversely elevate his reputation as an IRA spy catcher.’15 At the very least, there is a consensus from various sources including former British intelligence operators that a high-level agent called Stakeknife existed, regardless of that person’s true identity. Further revelations of high-level infiltration of the republican movement (the IRA and Sinn Féin) arose in late 2005. Denis Donaldson from Belfast went on Irish television to announce that he had been an informer since the 1980s.16 Donaldson had been in the IRA since 1969 and was interned with senior republicans during the 1970s.1
7 After his release, Donaldson stood for Sinn Féin in the Westminster elections in 1983. Despite failing to be elected, he would be an important ‘cog’ within Sinn Féin until 2005.18 Acquiring this man as a long-term informer was a major coup for British intelligence.

  Before the Stakeknife revelations in 2003, commentators were aware that the IRA suffered a degree of infiltration.19 But the exposure of Stakeknife and Donaldson as ‘high-level’ informers prompted many conflict participants and observers to reconsider why the IRA had ended its campaign.20 Various journalists concluded in 2003 that Stakeknife’s position within the IRA meant that he significantly disrupted the IRA’s operations, and helped to bring republicans to the negotiating table.21 Former IRA spies, British intelligence and military personnel have also emphasised that British intelligence efforts were crucial in bringing peace to Northern Ireland.22 Anthony McIntyre, a former republican prisoner, argues that Stakeknife and Donaldson facilitated the defeat of the IRA.23 On the other hand, leading republican supporters of the peace process, including Danny Morrison, reject this view.24