The Intelligence War against the IRA Read online

  [i]f the Provisionals really wanted to stop shooting, they only had to bury their arms and go home … We had nothing to offer the Provisionals … the consequences [of talking to the IRA] for Mr Whitelaw’s negotiations with Unionists and the SDLP … would be catastrophic.14

  Once more, British officials sent a negative reply to republicans via potential intermediaries.

  The British government gave their strongest rejection of talks to Sir John Hackett, one-time senior British Army commander and King’s College London principal. Hackett had been speaking with Dáithí Ó Conaill on the telephone in September 1973. He wanted to meet with Ó Conaill in Donegal. Hackett’s perception was that Ó Conaill only sought a ‘place at the conference table … the Provisionals would have to be recognised … if there was to be any genuine settlement in Ireland’. Woodfield warned Hackett that ‘there was no conference table of that kind and … there could be no … place at it for the Provisionals’.15 Nonetheless, Hackett continued talking to Ó Conaill and met an IRA intermediary in Donegal. He sent his report to Whitelaw on 4 October 1973.16 Whitelaw instructed Hackett to discontinue the conversations, since it put the Conservative government ‘in a false position’. Whitelaw stated, ‘Her Majesty’s Government will in no circumstances negotiate with the IRA.’17

  Despite various intermediaries suggesting that the IRA wanted a political compromise, the British Conservative government had the power to reject these approaches. The Hackett conversations with the IRA are evidence of some potential divisions within the state. But Whitelaw and Heath held the senior positions on Northern Irish policy. There was little that those who favoured returning to talks with the IRA could do. The IRA’s activities, including Bloody Friday, worked to the advantage of those who did not want to return to talks. The fear of angering unionists, particularly those within the Ulster Unionist Party who were contemplating whether to back a new power-sharing deal with the SDLP in 1973, can further account for why the British Cabinet refused to return to talks with the IRA. Whitelaw and Heath returned to the policy of using intelligence primarily to reduce republican support and armed capacity, rather than to search for a potential political deal involving the IRA.18 The intelligence services, particularly MI6, talked with republican intermediaries in this period and were fulfilling their non-partisan role. As Omand suggests, the intelligence analysts were to pass the information gathered over to the politicians, who would then decide how to act. The British government decided to discard the republican offer of further talks.19

  The British Labour government’s decision to reopen dialogue with the Provisionals was a direct result of the Sunningdale Agreement collapsing in May 1974.20 As Tommy McKearney argues, the British government adopted a ‘dual-approach’ strategy from May 1974. The British government permitted their security and intelligence forces to continue putting military pressure on the IRA, primarily through intelligence-led operations. The aim for the British government – but not necessarily for a majority in the security forces who saw an opportunity to significantly erode the IRA’s armed capabilities21 – was to force the IRA into a ceasefire. Once a ceasefire was called, British officials would try to convince republicans to ‘acquiesce’ in a political settlement with loyalists in a six-county framework. If the IRA returned to ‘war’, the British would ‘settle back for a long war of attrition at the end of which the IRA would either be annihilated, rendered impotent (and thus irrelevant) or exhausted and … agree to [a power-sharing political compromise on a six-county basis]’.22

  Taylor recalls British forces and intelligence aiming to ‘cut off the head’ of the IRA leadership in Belfast. The idea was that by removing republican leaders, the British forces could curtail the IRA’s campaign. British intelligence also targeted senior IRA members for ‘turning’, such as brigade quartermasters. They had access to weapons dumps and IRA volunteers who needed to access them. In theory, brigade quartermasters could set up multiple arrests.23 Operation Banner confirms that the British pursued an intelligence-led strategy in Belfast during these years. The report mentions: ‘intelligence operations … [i]n the mid-1970s … targeted … the HQ of the PIRA Belfast Brigade’. It claims that this strategy was effective.24 In addition, McKearney argues that the British tried to get the IRA to ‘acquiesce with London’s plans for a shared administration in a Northern Ireland firmly embedded within the United Kingdom’.25 Yet Wilson and Rees, amongst others, were contemplating an independent Northern Ireland.26

  There are competing academic and journalistic accounts surrounding the intentions of British political policy towards republicans between June 1974 and December 1975. These can be divided into four groups. First, there are authors who believe that the British government tricked the IRA into a ceasefire by promising to discuss withdrawal. In the meantime, the ceasefire sapped the IRA’s strength and provided time for the British to introduce new ‘criminalisation’ security measures and to phase out internment without trial.27 There are examples available that explain why these authors believe that the ceasefire was a trick. Brendan Hughes was in Long Kesh at the time. Hughes claims that the IRA leaders told the prisoners ‘the British want out’. But Hughes was very sceptical: ‘[a]t the same time, right beside us [in Long Kesh internment camp], there was this major prison being built’, which later became the Maze prison.28 According to Brendan Duddy, an IRA Army Council meeting was held on 4 June 1975. He records that Séamus Twomey ‘[a]sked consistently “What have you got for 100 hours of talking? Nothing”’.29 Some British archival evidence suggests that the British government had no intention of granting concessions to republicans in 1975. After the IRA called its prolonged cessation on 10 February 1975, for instance, Merlyn Rees, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, advised his colleagues that the government had to: ‘promote a ceasefire short of conceding anything of substance … [The IRA] would not find it easy to start a campaign again’. ‘Our aim’, Rees added, ‘should … be to play the Provisionals along’.30

  In contrast, Bew and Frampton argue that the British wanted a ceasefire, partly because ‘Harold Wilson’s personal pessimism over the situation [in Northern Ireland] brought a new round of flirtation with the idea of withdrawal.’ They add that Wilson’s policy advisor, Bernard Donoughue, and Rees also considered withdrawal. Nevertheless, Bew and Frampton stress that Wilson’s ideas were not ‘carefully thought out policy’ and that ‘British withdrawal at no point became the settled objective.’ They point to the opposition towards withdrawal from other parts of the British state, such as the civil service. Bew and Frampton conclude that the British state under Wilson ‘was not [a] monolithic entity’ and that there was no clear policy or preferred solution during 1975.31

  A third group of authors contend that there was an objective of politicising the IRA in 1975. Neumann argues that Rees was not considering withdrawal, because of the turmoil that would be left behind. Instead, Neumann suggests that Rees aimed to get ‘extremists’ to compromise together. Whilst admitting that government policy was not always clearly communicated, Neumann does see the central aim being to politicise the republican movement. Only once republicans refused to politicise did ‘the government’s motivation in maintaining the ceasefire [shift] towards … buying time for the long-intended reorganization of the military presence’.32

  Michael Kerr’s account does not fit into the three categories above. Kerr agrees that Rees and Wilson wanted to politicise the Provisionals. But he suggests that the aim of politicising republicans and loyalists was to initiate ‘some form of British withdrawal’. He argues that Wilson and Rees primarily wanted ‘a form of compromise that … paved the way for dominion status, or provoked an independence moment that resulted in Northern Ireland leaving the UK’. Kerr suggests that Rees wanted to utilise what he termed ‘Ulster Nationalism’ on the part of republicans and loyalists to see if they could agree to an independent Northern Ireland.33 There is evidence supporting Kerr’s view. In March 1975, Merlyn Rees noted in his own diary: ‘what we ne
ed is time … over a period of x years and that the more it unfolds … we will get to something like an independent [Northern Ireland] with links with the South [of Ireland]’.34 Kerr does admit that elements within the British state were against such a policy, such as the British Army, who believed that they could defeat the IRA.35 Kerr, however, complicates his position by not explicitly stating whether he feels that the British Labour government followed a clear policy at the time.

  The view presented below is different from the above accounts in several ways. I argue that there does seem to have been a clear policy of trying to reach a six-county settlement, most likely in the form of dominion status or independence. Ambiguity over policy was deliberately used to keep republicans and loyalists talking to British intermediaries. It also provided time for Wilson and Rees to achieve the maximum possible political withdrawal without provoking civil war. Whilst elements within the British state were unhappy with withdrawal, those directing policy, including Rees, Wilson and Sir Frank Cooper, the Permanent Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, met with little actual resistance.

  The British government was certainly using a ‘dual-approach’ strategy to try to get the IRA to agree to a ceasefire. Alongside a ceasefire weakening the Provisionals’ armed capacity, Rees felt that it provided the opportunity ‘to look for the outside chance of reaching some more substantial settlement with the Provisionals’. Rees believed that: ‘[n]o progress can be made without an end to violence. Violence cannot be ended except with the consent of Provisionals.’36 For this reason, the British Labour government intended to politicise the IRA. This aim motivated Rees’s House of Commons speech on 4 April 1974, where he announced the legalisation of Sinn Féin and the UVF. Rees claimed:

  there are signs that on both extreme wings there are people who … would now like to find a way back to political activity. It is right to encourage this … counterpart of our action against those who use violence.37

  His ambition to ‘encourage’ the politicisation of paramilitaries suggests that it was part of a dual strategy to reduce violence.

  Duddy’s diary and the republican movement’s minutes both record British representatives persistently asking republicans to take part in the Constitutional Convention. These were talks organised by the Labour government to reopen discussions on the future of Northern Ireland in May 1975. For instance, there was a formal meeting on 5 March 1975 between British intermediaries from MI6 and the Northern Ireland Office, with republican representatives including Ó Brádaigh and Billy McKee from Belfast. The republican transcriber notes:

  British … [say] convention is a sign that [Her Majesty’s Government] no longer wants to dictate events in Ireland … Westminster will look at every expression of view whether expressed through the convention or not. It would be a great pity if the Sinn Fein view does not come through … All options remain open.

  The republican movement was reluctant to engage in any political initiatives based on a six-county structure, since they wanted a nine-county Ulster parliament. Nevertheless:

  Brits replied that [a 32-county convention] was not possible because they rule 6 counties only … The Brits then said that Sinn Fein should attend the convention (6-county) and there advocate an all-Ireland convention. Perhaps an all-Ireland convention could follow after the 6-county convention.38

  The British were trying to show republicans that they had no problem with their objectives, if pursued politically. In a memorandum on 14 March 1975, Rees expressed his feeling that:

  [n]o process of reconciliation can be achieved without the consent and cooperation of extremists … they have the power to frustrate [the Convention]. I am discreetly seeking ways and means of encouraging them to talk together and to … the Convention.39

  These extracts show Rees’s and Wilson’s ambition to get republicans involved solely in politics. During a meeting between republican and British representatives on 19 March 1975, Ó Brádaigh records the British representatives saying: ‘Even one Sinn Fein representative at the convention would be very important to put Republican Policy forward.’40 At this point in early 1975, the British government saw the Convention as the best way to get the ‘extremists of all sides … to talk together’. Rees realised that if paramilitaries did not participate, their violence could ‘frustrate’ any political initiatives, as had occurred with the collapse of the Sunningdale executive in May 1974.

  More importantly, Wilson and Rees felt that the ‘extremists’ on both sides might agree to an independent Northern Ireland, potentially with dominion status.41 The diary of Bernard Donoughue, a senior policy advisor to Wilson, supports this argument. At the time of the collapse of the Sunningdale power-sharing executive in May 1974, Donoughue wrote that Wilson had begun to encourage other Labour Cabinet members and senior civil servants to contemplate options for withdrawal, including independence. On 20 May 1975, Donoughue records Wilson as being ‘in favour of “a sort of Dominion Status”’.42 On 29 May 1974, Wilson elaborated his preferred option to solve the conflict to Donoughue:

  Harold … began to describe the scenario, with ‘something like Dominion Status’ for the north of Ireland … to separate the constitutional, financial and military aspects of disengagement and have a separate timetable of withdrawal for each of them – in that order.43

  Donoughue suggests that Wilson envisaged British ‘disengagement’ in constitutional, financial and military matters in Northern Ireland being possible alongside ‘something like dominion status’. In Wilson’s view, British withdrawal could happen only if it coincided with dominion status or independence emerging in the North, to prevent a loyalist uprising and civil war emerging. He suspected civil war would occur if Britain disengaged unilaterally. Wilson’s negotiated independence idea for Northern Ireland was not an overreaction to the collapse of the power-sharing executive in May 1974. Donoughue says that in September 1975, over a year after the Sunningdale Agreement dissolved, that Wilson promoted dominion status for Northern Ireland during a Cabinet committee meeting: ‘Harold Wilson … dominated the meeting throughout. He pushed the “Dominion Status” solution.’44 Wilson and Donoughue again favoured this option during a meeting on 31 October 1975 with the Cabinet committee on Northern Ireland.45

  Other evidence shows Wilson favouring a form of independence for Northern Ireland between May 1974 and December 1975. British intermediaries told Brendan Duddy as much in September 1975. During a conversation between IRA representatives and Donald Middleton, a UK representative from the Northern Ireland Office, they discussed constitutional options. Middleton informed Duddy: ‘The PM (Harold Wilson) wanted neg[otiated]. Ind[ependence].’46 This example shows that Wilson was communicating constitutional options discussed at UK Cabinet level to intermediaries engaging in dialogue with republicans. He wanted to encourage movement towards discussions on independence between republicans and loyalists.

  The idea of British withdrawal following independence for Northern Ireland was not an option favoured only by Wilson and Donoughue. Donoughue records Frank Cooper supporting dominion status and independence in a meeting on 31 October 1975.47 Cooper seems to have discussed this idea with his colleagues, such as Middleton. Middleton, in turn, was suggesting the independence idea with republicans in backchannel talks during the 1975 ceasefire. Cooper was not alone. John Hunt, Secretary to the Cabinet, was apparently in favour of this option by late 1975 too.48 Roy Jenkins, Home Secretary, also favoured withdrawal. In early 1976, when it was rumoured that Jenkins might be appointed as the new Northern Ireland Secretary of State, British intermediaries told republicans that Jenkins supported withdrawal.49 More importantly, Merlyn Rees supported independence by 1975. Rees demonstrated his support for independence in his personal diary entry for March 1975, mentioned above. In addition, Rees informed the Northern Ireland ministerial committee in February 1975:

  [t]he Provisionals will no doubt try to bring us quickly to discuss a declaration of British intent to withdraw. We must … make them realise
that this is … an irrelevancy; it is their Protestant fellow-Irishmen with whom they must come to terms. But if the Provisionals are looking for a face-saving formula, I do not rule out the possibility that we could find a form of words which would … not inflame the Loyalists.50

  A ‘face-saving formula’ for the Provisionals about withdrawal that would ‘not inflame the Loyalists’ seems to imply Northern Irish dominion status or independence. Rees knew this was a possible political solution, because British intermediaries had met leading UDA members and loyalists in June 1974, some of whom favoured considering independence.51

  There were individuals within the British state who rejected the idea of Ulster independence. These included various civil servants.52 Nonetheless, Donoughue points out that Wilson did try to ‘initiate’ policy on Northern Ireland in 1974 and 1975. Donoughue also believes that ‘the Prime Minister’s mood, his personal views and reactions at any particular time wholly determined what we could or could not achieve or help him to achieve’.53 If Wilson was in favour or against an idea, he had a key influence on the evolution of policy. The evidence suggests other ministers and advisors influencing Northern Irish political policy such as Rees and Cooper were also willing to explore independence. Wilson updated Rees about the secret backchannel contacts with the IRA in 1975. Those who favoured independence, such as Rees and Wilson, had the dominant influence over policy, which helped determine the topic of conversations between republicans and British intermediaries. Various factors, including the limited prospects for power-sharing after the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in May 1974, IRA activity continuing including in England, as well as Wilson’s and Rees’s increasing awareness from intelligence that IRA leaders may have been ready to politically compromise, favoured those who wanted to talk to the IRA within the British state.